Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense by Shi, Wei
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 32 | Number 1 Article 1
Fall 2006
Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is
Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense
Wei Shi
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wei Shi, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense, 32 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 1 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol32/iss1/1
Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant
Offense
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This article is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol32/iss1/1
Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property:
Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense?
Wei Shit
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ....................................................................... 2
II. Confucius Confusion: To Steal a Book is an Elegant
Offense? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Exploring Confucian Values ..................................... 5
1. Principles of Confucianism ................................... 5
2. Confucian Values and Intellectual Property ...... 7
3. The Diminution of Confucian Values ................... 9
4. Kong Yi Ji as a Harlequin .................................... 11
5. The Paradox of Confucian Determinism ............. 12
B. Utilitarianism Rather Than Confucianism ................ 12
1. By-product of Economic Reform ........................ 13
2. Special Political Ecology and Socio-economic
C rises ................................................................... 14
3. The Sprouting and Growing of the Utilitarian
Im pulse ................................................................ 16
C. From Marx's Atheism to "Belief Vacuum" ............. 19
1. Religions Currently Accepted ............................ 20
2. The Gap with Reality .......................................... 21
3. A Syllogistic Implication ..................................... 22
D. Press Control Policy: "Coin It In Silence" ............... 22
E. Ignorance of the Notion of Private Rights ............... 24
III. Insight into the Economic Spectrum .............................. 27
A. Market Impetus: A Nationwide Shadow Economy ...... 27
B. Stage Theory for IPR Protection .............................. 29
t Ph.D Candidate, St. John's College, University of Cambridge; Fellow of
Cambridge Overseas Society, University of Cambridge; Visiting Fellow of Lauterpacht
Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge. Prior to the doctoral study, the
author was an Associate Professor at the Law School of Shandong University, China.
The author would like to thank Mr. Nick Sinclair-Brown for his careful and insightful
supervision and his valuable comments on a previous version of this article.
Appreciation also goes to Mr. Robert Weatherly and Mr. John Forsyth for their valuable
comments. Of course, all the errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the
author. Any suggestions and comments should be addressed to St. John's College,
Cambridge CB2 ITP, United Kingdom (w.shi@cantab.net).
2 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXII
C. Outlook For IPR Protection in China ....................... 31
IV. The Stones from Other Hills: Experiences of Japan and
K orea ............................................................................ . . 32
A. The Japanese Experience .......................................... 32
1. A Glance Back at Japan's IP Law and Policy ......... 32
2. Confucian Values and Intellectual Creation ........ 36
3. Tolerant IPR Policy and Economic Blooming ........ 37
B. The Korean Experience ............................................. 38
1. "Eastern Decorum" and Economic Miracle ...... 39
2. Weak IPR Protection and "Development
Policy". ............................................................... 40
3. From "Breaking" to "Preaching:" Role Shift in
IPR Protection .......................... ..................... 42
C. Preliminary Reflections ............................................. 43
V . C onclusion ....................................................................... 46
I. Introduction
Due to a strong perception of legislative shortfalls, China is
conventionally seen as one of the main offenders in the
international intellectual property arena. However, over the last
two decades, China has established a full panoply of intellectual
property rights (IPR) legislation and institutions.' In China today,
it is the enforcement of IPR that is contrastingly fragile. The
enforcement of IPR has emerged as the essential issue to be
resolved when reviewing China's IPR. It is no longer persuasive
for the Chinese government merely to point to the existence of
legislation as proof of China's compliance with its World Trade
Organization (WTO) commitments.
There is extensive theoretical literature examining the IPR
enforcement problem in China. Confucianism is the concept most
frequently cited by commentators, and the literature criticizing
Confucian philosophy as the root of China's IPR enforcement
problems is plenteous.2 The prevailing point of view is that
I See Robert Bejesky, Investing in the Dragon: Managing the Patent Versus Trade
Secret Protection Decision for the Multinational Corporation in China, I I TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 437, 487 (2004) ("China has eagerly consummated international
treaties and has adopted strong domestic [intellectual property legislation] ... to attract
technological innovations"); see also Warren Newberry, Copyright Reform in China: A
"TRIPs" Much Shorter and Less Strange Than Imagined?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1446
(2003) (concluding that "reforms brought China's copyright regime into compliance with
the TRIPs Agreement and the Berne Convention").
2 See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
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traditional Chinese philosophy-Confucianism in particular-
provides a pervasive and unconscious influence on the
comprehension of, and commitment to, intellectual property laws.
One cynical commentator has even asserted that "until it abandons
its twisted Confucianism, the [Asian] region will trail the West,"
3
and, as a result, alleged that "it is time to deconstruct Confucius."4
This argument levels criticism at the phrase "to steal a book is an
elegant offense" (qie shu bu suan tou), which indicates that
traditional Chinese culture does not consider copying to be
"wrong." Under the dominating theory of this point of view,
Confucianism is a cultural predisposition leading to a lack of
consciousness of intellectual property,5 and the creed of the
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 8, 19-22 (1995) (discussing how
the Confucian culture militated against copyright protection and did not allow
intellectual property protection to take root); Alexander C. Chen, Climbing the Great
Wall: A Guide to Intellectual Property Enforcement in the People's Republic of China,
25 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10 (1997) ("Confucianism... provided [a] strong barrier[] to the idea
of 'intellectual property' .... ); Andrew Evans, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The
WTO, TRIPS and Chinese Amendments to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 587, 588-90 (2003) (suggesting that Confucian ethics has been a philosophical
obstacle to combating Chinese counterfeiting and piracy); Jill Chiang Fung, Can Mickey
Mouse Prevail in the Court of the Monkey King? Enforcing Foreign Intellectual
Property Rights in the People's Republic of China, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 613,
616-24 (1996) (describing how the modem Chinese laws have incorporated the pure
Confucian ideas inherent in traditional Chinese legal thinking, which have especially
influenced the development of China's intellectual property laws); Eric M. Griffin, Stop
Relying on Uncle Sam!-A Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection in the People's
Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 182 (1998) ("[M]ore important than
the lack of protective influence by the state is the influence of Confucianism .... "); Ann
Kent, Waiting for Rights: China's Human Rights and China's Constitutions, 1949-1989,
13 HUM. RTS. Q. 170, 174 (1991) (stating that the Chinese view of rights is attributable
to the "traditional concepts of society, the state, and the law," and these concepts, in turn,
are deeply rooted in Confucian philosophy and ideology); Peter K. Yu, The Second
Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 11 OCCASIONAL PAPERS INTELL. PROP.
FROM BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. L., YESHIVA U. 6, 16-26 (2002) (contending that
China's intellectual property reform met with resistance largely due to cultural barriers
reflected by the Confucian values visible in nearly every echelon of Chinese society).
3 Sin-ming Shaw, It's True. Asians Can't Think, TIME INTERNATIONAL, May 31,
1999, at 23.
4 Id.
5 Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Accession, Film Piracy and
Prospects for Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 63,
74-80 (2002) (ascribing China's IPR enforcement problem to cultural and historical
predispositions).
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"elegant offense" is likely to have a continuing influence on
attitudes to IPR protection. In this article, the author aims to raise
a challenge to this mainstream perception and demonstrate the
genuine causes of China's IPR enforcement problems.
The reasons for the enforcement problems are so complex and
varied that a comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of this
article.6 This article considers the enforcement insufficiency via a
discussion of the evolving cultural phenomena associated with the
fundamental systemic weakness of China's institutional problems.
Section II argues that current mainstream legal epistemology
incorrectly links China's enforcement problem to Confucian
values, which is confusing and misleading. This section
challenges the mainstream viewpoint by providing clues to the
genuine Chinese cultural underpinnings and further creates a new
cultural perspective. Section III examines the copying
phenomenon through insights into the economic sphere and seeks
to assess the link between economic development and intellectual
property protection. Apart from exploring the origin, evolution,
and impact of Confucian values on current Chinese society,
Section IV extends beyond China to focus on the global
intellectual property regime. This section also compares China to
other economies that have emerged in Asia, such as Japan and
Korea, which share similar Confucian values. By tracing and
comparing development trajectories of different economies, this
article demonstrates that counterfeiting and piracy are not
problems caused by the Confucian ethics, as the mainstream view
states, but rather common, inevitable consequences of inadequate
economic development and a by-product of a unique set of
socioeconomic crises deriving from the development of a
dysfunctional institutional regime.
6 Generally, the major problems that are not examined in this article include lack
of transparency, local protectionism, an inadequate judiciary, and market impetus. For
an examination of lack of transparency, see Reiko R. Feaver, China's Copyright Law
and the TRIPS Agreement, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 431, 455-56 (1996). For a
discussion of local protectionism and an inadequate judiciary, see Jeffrey W. Berkman,
Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to Protection and the Need for
the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 17-22 (1996); Geoffrey T. Willard, An
Examination of China's Emerging Intellectual Property Regime: Historical
Underpinnings, the Current System and Prospects for the Future, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 411,429-31 (1996).
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II. Confucius Confusion: To Steal a Book is an Elegant
Offense?
A. Exploring Confucian Values
1. Principles of Confucianism
Confucianism is an ancient Chinese way of thought that spread
through much of the neighboring Asian region, including Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.7  As a systematic code of
interpersonal behavior, Confucianism is a practical, political, and
social doctrine, rather than a religion or a quasi-religion.8
As a philosophical system, Confucianism has been developed
from the writings attributed to the Chinese philosopher Confucius
(551-479 BC). 9 Born into a middle class family,"° Confucius lived
in ancient China during a time of great chaos and feudal rivalry
known as the Warring States Period (Zhanguo Shidai).ll He is
credited with numerous books, the best-known of which is The
Analects, a collection of his sayings which was compiled into its
modem form during the Han Dynasty (206 BC-24 AD). 12  His
7 It is debatable whether Confucianism should be described as a religion, or a
quasi-religion. While it involves much ritual, little of it could be construed as worship or
meditation in a formal sense. Whether Confucianism should be considered a religious
tradition or not is part of the question of how to define Confucianism. The
interpretations of Confucianism are divergent. See XINZHOG YAO, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONFUCIANISM 38-39 (2000).
8 See CHINA: A HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DICTIONARY 62 (Michael Dillon ed.,
1998); see also Yongming Chen, Ruxue Yu Zhonggue Zongjiao Chuantong
Confucianism and China's Religious Tradition], in RELIGIOUS CULTURE PRESS 109-31
(2003) (stating that, as an orthodox philosophy, Confucianism contains few
characteristics found in religions).
9 His Chinese name Master Kong (Kung Futze / Kong Fuzi) was later latinized to
Confucius by Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) in order to portray Chinese society
to Europeans. See YAO, supra note 7 at 1-2, 21-22.
10 PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY, THE CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CHINA 42
(1996).
11 See CHINA: A HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 62-63
(explaining that Confucianism had no priesthood or liturgy and Confucius himself was
not treated as god).
12 Written by his pupils, The Analects is regarded as the chief text of Confucianism.
It contains sayings and conversations between the Teacher and his disciples. For a full
text and comprehensive interpretation of The Analects, see CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
writings and beliefs did not become popular until well after his
death 3 and international recognition and study of Confucianism
did not occur until the sixteenth century.' 4
Confucian thought is based on varying levels of honesty. The
rituals of Confucianism evolved over time and matured into the
four forms: li-ritual (which originally meant "to sacrifice"); xiao-
filial piety; zhong-loyalty; ren-humaneness. 5 The 1i is roughly
analogous to the Western concept of natural law. 16  It governs
people's conduct and proper etiquette with regard to interactions
with family, political establishments, and society at large, and
emphasizes virtue and model behavior.'7 In Confucianism, the
ultimate political goal is to create great harmony in the world, as
"everyone all over the world ought to be brothers." 8
Confucianism has shaped the Chinese people's views, which have
been developed over the course of tens of centuries."
One of Confucius's most important doctrines is that there is a
proper order to all things in the universe, including human society,
which is described as "harmony."2 °  Confucius illustrated this
doctrine as "let a ruler be a ruler, a subject a subject, a father a
father, and a son a son (jun jun chen chen fu fu zi zi)."' Through
(Raymond Dawson trans., 1993).
13 See CHINA: A HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 204.
14 YAO, supra note 7, at 2 (mentioning that, by introducing Confucianism to
Europe, Jesuit Matteo Ricci became a pioneer of Confucian studies in the West).
15 See HYUNG KIM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE WEST: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 30-31 (1981).
16 Id. at 57.
17 Id.
18 CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS 44-45, bk. 12, chp. 5 (Raymond Dawson trans.,
1993).
19 KIM, supra note 15, at 30.
20 See YAO, supra note 7, at 172. In Confucianism, "harmony" is deemed as "the
highest virtue," and is closely related to nature, politics, ethics and daily life, and is
regarded as a moral standard to cultivate order and peace internally and externally. See
id.
21 CONFUCIUS, supra note 12, at 46, bk. 12, chp.ll. When Duke Jing of Qi
consulted Confucius about government, Confucius replied that the only way such a
doctrine could be made to work properly was for each person to act according to
prescribed relationships. That is, let everyone play his proper role in the natural order,
and all will be well.
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the definition of "five cardinal relationships," Confucius provided
a simple guide for ordering the family and society. The five moral
disciplines that govern the five cardinal relationships are: (1)
Justice and righteousness should mark the relations between
sovereign and subject; (2) A proper rapport should be maintained
between father and son; (3) Division of duties between husband
and wife; (4) The younger should give precedence to the elder;
and (5) Faith and trust should reign over relationships between
friends.22  Confucius's "five cardinal relationships" reflect a
hierarchical order based on a set of virtues.23  As Confucius
emphasized, within and through this traditional order, peace and
harmony can be achieved if every person plays his or her proper
role in society and strives to uphold the responsibilities of that
role.24 In this context, Confucianism advocates the virtues of
honesty and loyalty in an effort to create a harmonious social
order.
2. Confucian Values and Intellectual Property
As the oldest continuous civilization in the East, China has
long been regarded as an "exceptionally creative and inventive"
nation and has enjoyed a remarkable history of technological and
creative enterprise. 5 It is common knowledge that the Chinese
invented a number of items prior to their "invention" or use in the
West.2 6  The famous four great inventions - papermaking,
typography, the compass, and gunpowder 27-have profoundly
22 See ROUTLEDGE CURZON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONFUCIANISM 501-03 (Xinzhong
Yao ed., 2003).
23 See id.; see also Ronald J. Troyer, Chinese Thinking about Crime and Social
Control, in SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 45, 51-52 (Ronald J.
Troyer et al. eds., 1989) (claiming that Confucian philosophy has designated the
importance of particular actors in society by placing the state first, the collective second,
and the right of the individual last).
24 See ROUTLEDGE CURZON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONFUCIANISM, supra note 22, at
501.
25 John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes toward
Property Rights Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 735, 742 (1999).
26 Id.
27 See id. For a detailed introduction of the Chinese innovations, see generally
Joseph Needham, Science and China's Influence on the World, in THE LEGACY OF CHINA
234 (Raymond Dawson ed., 1971); ROBERT K. G. TEMPLE, THE GENIUS OF CHINA: 3,000
YEARS OF SCIENCE, DISCOVERY, AND INVENTION (1986).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
impacted the world's economy and human culture. Trademarks in
China can be traced back to the Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.),
when traders "started using marks and logos to distinguish
goods. 28  With the advent of printing technology in the Tang
Period, China also saw the first "substantial, sustained efforts to
regulate publication and republication. ' 29 During the Ming and
Qing Dynasties, an "informal system of guild registration and
protection of [trade]marks was instituted, where a manufacturer
could register his trademark with other guilds."3 ° As early as the
Imperial Period, beginning in 221 B.C., 31 Chinese rulers issued
decrees criminalizing the copying of certain works,32 although
these decrees could hardly be characterized as copyright in the
modem sense.3 3  Not surprisingly, the historical record dealing
with intellectual property in China appeared very early.
At least to some extent, Confucius can be viewed as a popular
international synonym of China, and Confucianism has been
acknowledged as the foundational philosophy of oriental
civilization and culture.34 In contrast to most Western societies,
Confucian ethics is composed not of "individuals" per se but of
their interconnections and interdependencies. 35  Accordingly,
Confucian ethics places a relatively low value on terms based on
individuals and profit, but it does place value on the concept of
28 Hamideh Ramjerdi & Anthony D'Amato, The Intellectual Property Rights Laws
of The People's Republic of China, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 169, 172 (1995).
29 Gregory S. Feder, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You
Can Lead a Horse to Water, but You Can't Make It Drink, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 223, 230
(1996) (quoting WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 13 (1995)).
30 Charles Baum, Trade Sanctions and the Rule of Law: Lessons from China, 1
STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 46, 51 (2001), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/
sjeaa/journal 1/china4.pdf.
31 The year 221 B.C., which marks the shift from state to empire, represents the
beginning of the imperial era, a period that lasted until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in
1912. See CHINA: A HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 154.
32 Baum, supra note 30, at 50 ("Han dynasty regulations (circa 200 B.C.), for
example, barred the unauthorized reproduction of the Confucian Classics.").
33 Allison & Lin, supra note 25, at 743.
34 KIM, supra note 15, at 30-31.
35 Id.
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communal property.36  This is at significant variance with the
dominating personal rights and property bases that are important
to Western ideas. The Western concept of property is closely
associated with the philosophy of natural law originating with the
Greek Stoics 37 and later interpreted and codified by Roman
philosophers and jurists, 38 while Confucianism reflects the natural
order and emphasizes the obligations necessary to maintain it.
Nevertheless, this unique philosophy has played a positive role
in fostering innovation and entrepreneurship over the centuries in
China and other Eastern nations. Confucianism does not reject
personal rights, but affords protection in a different way. Its
emphasis on "personal development, in contrast to personal gain,
helped create a culture in which the individual was viewed as quite
important, but primarily so because of his or her contribution to
society."39  It would therefore be inaccurate to state that
Confucianism and technology cannot coexist, or that
Confucianism has served to hold back technological
development.4 ° Under the set of Confucian ethics there appears no
credible evidence of a link between honesty and loyalty on the one
hand and counterfeiting and piracy on the other.
3. The Diminution of Confucian Values
The influence of Confucian values has been diminishing and,
although widely thought to be the most important basis of Chinese
culture, the sage's ideas were severely criticized during the
"Cultural Revolution" (1966-76)" 1 as the "superstructure of
36 Id.
37 See Ellis Washington, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Natural Law vs.
Judicial Personal Policy Preferences, 10 DEAKIN L. REV. 772, 775 (2005).
38 Id.
39 Allison & Lin, supra note 25, at 744.
40 See generally David J. Thorpe, Some Practical Points About Starting a Business
in Singapore, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1039 (1994) (demonstrating the extent of economic
development in Singapore).
41 The Cultural Revolution, more precisely known as the "Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution," was a massive attempt by Mao Zedong to inculcate the younger
Chinese generation with his ardor for totalistic iconoclasm. The so-called "Four Olds,"
especially the traditional religions and philosophies, which were relegated to the sphere
of feudal superstitions, were attacked and destroyed. For a comprehensive account of
the Cultural Revolution, see 15 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 305-06, 660-65
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
feudalism."42  During this period, statues at the Confucians'
Temple were regarded as feudal relics and were seriously
damaged by the "Red Guards. 43  Although the broken statues
were later carefully mended, this was more to preserve historical
heritage than to demonstrate a widespread reconciliation between
Confucianism and current beliefs.'
From that time on, the influence of Confucian values has been
diminishing. Now, in modem day China, attitudes towards
traditional Confucian values tend to fall into two attitudinal
categories based on age, education, and experience.45 Older
generations tend to adhere to practices steeped in Confucianism
and think of ethical behavior as a long-term commitment. In
contrast, younger generations-bom in the 1960s and
1970s-influenced by modem culture are apathetic and give little
thought to traditional values.46 Thus, the Confucian tradition is
fading and dwindling gradually, despite the attempts of many
scholars to interpret Confucian ethics as a spiritual resource for the
emerging global community.47
(Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank eds., 1991).
42 See WILLEM VAN KEMENADE, CHINA, HONG KONG, TAIWAN, INC. 373 (Diane
Webb trans., 1998).
43 The Red Guards in China were composed of high school and university students
and young workers, and were formed during the conflict within factions of the Chinese
Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. The name was borrowed
from the krasnaya gvardia, who protected Lenin after the October Revolution. See THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA, supra note 41, at 84-85; see also CHINA: A HISTORICAL
AND CULTURAL DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 260-61.
44 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA, supra note 41, at 84-85.
45 See Mengxi Liu, Lun Chuantong Wenhua de Liushi yu Chongjian [the Erosion
and Reconstruction of the Traditional Culture], CONTEMP. PHIL., Sept. 20, 2004,
http://www.contemphil.net/articles/news/lwhctdlsycj.htm.
46 Id.
47 In the last two decades, a number of "leading [Neo-]Confucian thinkers in
Taiwan, mainland China, and Hong Kong independently concluded that the most
significant contribution the Confucian tradition can offer the global community is the
[conception] of the 'Unity of Heaven and Humanity' [tian ren he yi] ...." Tu Weiming,
The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the
World, 130 DAEDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS SC. 243 (2001). In mainland China, more
recently, a Neo-Confucian revival movement (Guoxuefuxing yundong) has taken shape
among Chinese scholars and social critics who aim to explicitly promote Confucian
values in society and strengthen the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. See id.
at 243-64.
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4. Kong Yi Ji as a Harlequin
One important element of the misunderstanding of Confucian
values is the intentionally or unintentionally misattributed
proposition "To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense" (Qie Shu Bu
Suan Tou). This is a concept unknown to Confucianism and was
only popularized with the 1919 publication of the popular fictional
book Kong Yi Ji, written by the famous novelist Lu Xun.48 In his
book, Lu exemplifies his belief that literature should be socially
relevant, and attempts to avoid the "clich6s" of traditional Chinese
linguistics that, in his view, had hampered and restrained people's
creative thinking for centuries. In Lu Xun's portrayal, Kong Yi Ji
was depicted as a poor harlequin, who was "a big, pallid man
whose wrinkled face often bore scars," and was made fun of by
everybody.4 9 He earned a living from copying manuscripts for
rich patrons and sometimes stole books to trade for wine. His
behavior drew on his being soundly beaten. "To Steal a Book Is an
Elegant Offense" was his argument when he was taunted. 0 His
personal character and way of thinking are thus far removed from
the Confucian values. However, he shares the same Chinese
surname with Confucius (Kong), and this did much to cause and
perpetuate confusion in the popular mind. Indeed, the phrase "To
Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense" was unknown to Chinese until
Kong Yi Ji as a fictional character appeared in the early twentieth
century and, interestingly, it was unpopular with foreigners until
Professor Alford's book, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense:
Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization, made its debut
in the mid 1990s.51
48 Lu Xun (1881-1936), pseudonym of Zhou Shuren, was a short-story writer,
essayist, critic, and literary theorist. He is arguably one of the greatest writers of modern
China, and is considered a revolutionary pioneer by Chinese Communists. In some of
his works, Lu Xun contrasted the hypocrisy of upper-class intellectuals with the
suffering of the lower-class people and condemned the traditional Confucian culture.
For a comprehensive introduction to his work, see JAMES REEVE PUSEY, Lu XUN AND
EVOLUTION (1998); JON EUGENE VON KOWALLIS, THE LYRICAL Lu XUN: A STUDY OF His
CLASSICAL-STYLE VERSE (1996).
49 Lu XUN, KONG Yi Ji, NA HAN [OUTCRY] 20-25 (RENMIN WENXUE CHUBANSHE
[PEOPLE'S LITERATURE PRESS] 1973).
50 Id.
51 See ALFORD, supra note 2.
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5. The Paradox of Confucian Determinism
When it comes to intellectual property enforcement problems
in China and other Asian countries, Confucianism is commonly
identified as the root of the problem. This suggests a question: in
the current legal and political environment, where intellectual
property is to be respected under the law, should Confucian values
restrain people from breaking the law, or remain a passive
influence allowing it to be broken?
As previously noted, Confucian ethics promote social order
and ethical behavior. Confucius emphasized that each person has
responsibilities to live up to within the social order and position
they are in.52 Traditionally, in China, ethical and moral obligations
formed the basis for personal and commercial communications
and, as a result of Confucian philosophy, moral obligations may
well have a greater influence on Chinese attitudes than Western
thought may perceive.53
It is apparent that the predominant commentary on Confucian
philosophy serves to obscure rather than illuminate the situation.
This is true because it is difficult to comprehend the prevalent
theft of intellectual property in China as an inevitable outcome of
an ethic that advocates "honesty," unless of course the ethical
concepts derived from Confucius have somehow been subverted.
As a non-Western philosophy, Confucianism did not prevent
intellectual property protection from functioning in Chinese
society.54 "To steal a book" is not an "elegant offense." Rather,
from a Confucian viewpoint it is an act that is against the "natural
order." Confucius has been the convenient scapegoat of a
misleading theory. Now it is the time to rehabilitate Confucianism
and identify more compelling causes.
B. Utilitarianism Rather Than Confucianism
As previously discussed, Confucianism has faded in mainland
China in recent decades. As a result, older Chinese ethics have
52 ROUTLEDGE CURZON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONFUCIANISM, supra note 22, at 1-23.
53 YINGSHI Yu, ZHONGGUO CHUANTONG SIXIANG DE XIANDAI QUANSHI [THE
MODERN INTERPRETATION OF CHINESE TRADITIONAL THOUGHT] 130 (1987).
54 Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 132 (2003) (mentioning the compatiblity between
Confucian philosophy and intellectual property in Chinese society).
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eroded and more pragmatic and self-serving utilitarian ideas have
replaced them.55 The utilitarian concepts found fertilization in a
set of socioeconomic crises that originated from a haphazard and
dysfunctional institutional regime.
1. By-product of Economic Reform
Many critics have linked economic change to greater political
freedom in China.56 But the reality is that China is currently
standing at an ideological, social, and political crossroads: the
intersection of a splendid economic landscape marred by lagging
political reform.57 Like two lines askew, China's economic and
political structures are contrastingly divergent.
On one hand, Chinese leaders genuinely believe that the
Western style of democracy is not suitable for the fundamental
realities (guoqing) of China.58 They have learned from China's
modem history59 and the recent history of the former Soviet Union
that Western-style democracy will lead the country to social chaos
and state fragmentation,6 ° or they may be afraid that the
Communist Party will lose its dominant position if radical
democratization takes place.6' Political reform has thus been
55 Philosophically, utilitarianism is a theory of ethics that prescribes the
quantitative maximization of good consequences for a population. See generally JOHN
PLAMENATZ, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS (1958) (providing a comprehensive discussion
of utilitarianism). The ethical theory proposed by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill states
that all action should be directed towards achieving the greatest happiness for the
greatest number of people. See id. To examine the utilitarianism in a philosophical
perspective is beyond the scope of this article. Here this term is only used to describe the
dominating self-serving phenomena of losing ethical constrains in China.
56 Allison & Lin, supra note 25, at 774.
57 See Wei-Wei Zhang, China's Political Transition: Trends and Prospects, 7
EURASIA BULLETIN: PUBLICATION OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR ASIAN STUDIES 11 (2003)
(asserting that Chinese economic reform may better be described as "great economic
reform with lesser political reform").
58 INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, BUILDING OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN CHINA §1 (Oct. 19, 2005),
http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/democracy/democracy.html.
59 Id.
60 See Mu Bai, Sulian Jubian Gaosu Women Shenme [What the Collapse of the
Soviet Union Tells Us], PEOPLES DAILY ONLINE, Nov. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2962514.html.
61 Id.
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characterized by incrementalism and progress made only by the
trial and error method,62 working through existing political
institutions within the one-party framework.63 The stated objective
of the Communist Party to implement political reform is often just
a way to strengthen its own legitimacy.4 Despite limited efforts at
political reform, China still remains both fundamentally
undemocratic and incapable of articulating a long-term plan for
democratization.65
On the other hand, there are growing concerns that the ongoing
economic reform may have opened a Pandora's Box of unintended
consequences. Harry Harding, a leading expert on China, has
suggested that while "dismantling many of the totalitarian
institutions of the past, the Chinese Communist party was not
prepared to move equally rapidly towards the creation of new
institutions that could permit the articulation or aggregation of
political demands. 66 As a consequence, economic reform has not
only brought about greater prosperity, but also created
"unprecedented opportunities for people to pursue their own
interest and shape their own destiny., 67 Individual aspirations of
the citizens are widespread, but they are released without a
corresponding regulatory system.
2. Special Political Ecology and Socio-economic Crises
Having failed to bring its political evolution into
comprehensive correspondence with its economic development,
the Chinese government runs the risk of precipitating the social
62 INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, supra note 58, at § VI.
63 Zhang, supra note 57, at 3.
64 Anthony Saich, Editorial, Beijing's Balancing Act on Reform, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2002/saich-reform-ft_
I 10402.htm (mentioning that substantive political reform would strengthen the
legitimacy of party rule, and a "more democratic system would provide a residual
legitimacy that might help the regime to negotiate the difficult transition ahead").
65 See Xianglin Xu, Yi Zhengzhi Wending Wei Jichu de Zhongguo Jianjin Gaige
[China's Political Reform is Preoccupied by Incrementalism], 5 STRATEGY AND
MANAGEMENT (2000), available at http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=239.
66 PACIFIC CENTURY: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PACIFIC ASIA 423 (Mark
Borthwick ed., 1992).
67 Zhang, supra note 57, at 2.
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instability and civil strife that Chinese leaders have sought to
avoid by means of rigid political control. Against the backdrop of
economic transition, the Chinese government has found itself in a
precarious position. They must confront the grievous crises that
rapid economic development is bringing; i.e., parasitic state
enterprises, a dangerously overextended banking sector, regional
disparities, rampant income gaps, 68  rising unemployment,
69
widespread official corruption and, arguably the most serious, a
collapse of traditional values.7 °
Since the economic reform began, crime and violence have
risen, provoking widespread concerns about social stability and
personal security.7 China's socioeconomic disorder has been
accentuated by the erosion of traditional values. The profound
changes taking place have unsettled the beliefs and values of
Chinese people. 72  The "rules of the game" by which Chinese
citizens planned their lives for so many years have been
undermined, producing an altered set of winners and losers. 73 The
negative elements of society that socialism was designed to
eliminate over the past decades-including landlordism,
unemployment, criminal mafias, and prostitution-are abundant
68 China's income gap widened in the first quarter of 2005, with 10 percent of the
nation's richest people enjoying 45 percent of the country's wealth, while China's
poorest 10 percent had only 1.4 percent of the nation's wealth. See Income gap in China
Widens in First Quarter, CHINA DAILY, June 19, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
english/doc/2005-06/19/content_452636.htm.
69 In March 2005, 11 million urban residents, including those entering the
workplace for the first time, ex-servicemen and college graduates, need to find
employment. There are now 13 million unemployed and laid-off urban workers, and
large numbers of surplus rural laborers need to find jobs in urban areas. See China
expects higher urban unemployment rate in 2005, CHINA NEWS NET, Mar. 6, 2005,
http://www.chinanews.cn/news/2004/2005-03-06/2238.shtml.
70 Anne F. Thurston, Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots
China, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (1998), http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/thurst23/
thurst23.html.
71 See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years,
20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 390-91 (2000).
72 See Id.
73 See Martin King Whyte, Chinese Popular Views about Inequality, ASIAN
PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT 5 (2002), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/
pubs/asiarpt_ 104.pdf.
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and are appearing on the scene once again.74
Disparities in income and wealth are growing intensely, and
are not justified by national needs or meritocratic efficiency.75
Many of the benefits of the reforms are seen as "monopolized by
the rich and powerful, whose gains are due to corruption and
connections, rather than to entrepreneurship, intelligence, hard
work, or contributions to social welfare."76  Gratitude for past
improvements in general living standards has faded since the
endeavor to meet family needs has been fraught with difficulties.
Profound demoralization is widespread among officials and the
broader citizenry.77 The specter of loss of employment, health
insurance coverage, and other basics of life that have resulted from
the state-led assault on the "iron rice bowl" security of the socialist
era fosters nostalgia for the old days when Mao Zedong was in
charge of the nation's fate. 78 A great variety of satiric doggerel
verses criticizing social evils and political scandals are spread
privately through dinner conversation, Internet forums, 79 and
mobile messages as limited means of airing grievances.
3. The Sprouting and Growing of the Utilitarian Impulse
The cascading societal and political problems have, in many
circumstances, frustrated the efforts of ordinary Chinese citizens
to earn their living through normal channels. In order to survive
the upheaval, people have to contemplate every possible approach
they deem workable. Hedonism, money worship, and
utilitarianism now dominate many people's minds throughout the
country and "money for power" exchanges have been an
increasing game throughout the country. 80 As Chinese scholar
74 See id. at 5-6.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Yongqi Zhao, Yong Daode Guifan Quan Shehui [Strengthen the Morality of Our
Society], PEOPLE'S DAILY (Overseas Edition), Jan. 29, 2002, at 2 (describing different
forms of demoralization in Chinese society).
78 Id.
79 Those satiric doggerel verses, usually by anonymous authors, can be easily
found inside the chatrooms of the major Chinese web portals such as Sina and Sohu.
80 Yi-min Lin, State and Markets under China's Transformation: Rethinking
China's Economic Transformation, 29 CONTEMP. SoC. 608, 609 (2000) (reviewing HE
QINGLIAN, XIANDAIHUA DE XIANJING: DANGDAI ZHONGGUO DE JINGJIN SHEHUI WENTI
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Stanley Lubman stated; "Relations among Chinese are changing,
as new networks of personal relationships appear as [a] means of
getting things done."'" The shift is exacerbated by the weakness
of ethical constraints and the shared personal standards that might
otherwise have provided a normative framework for interpersonal
communications and market transactions. Ironically, the money
fetishism8 2 that Karl Marx criticized over a century ago may now
have been adopted as the credo of many people who are, or used to
be, his faithful disciples.
All of these issues call for a more sophisticated and
accountable government and a more liberalized political system,
which would be a better way of tackling some of the new
inequalities than such current outbursts as rioting and
demonstrations." However, many commentators are pessimistic
about China's commitment to adhering to the rule of law.84
Nevertheless, China has demonstrated "a desire to join the global
stage," which will force China to "undergo a tortuous path ... as it
navigates from an isolated socialist country to a market-oriented,
centrally-planned regime ', 85 where individual liberty and property
rights are protected under the rule of law.
The 1990s have brought the beginning of what could
eventually prove to be a significant wave of political reform with
[PITFALLS OF MODERNIZATION: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA] (1997)) (mentioning that a large number of active players (e.g., enterprise
leaders) in China's new economic game are increasingly engaged lucrative corrupt
activties with officals to embezzle public assets).
81 Lubman, supra note 71, at 404.
82 Money fetishism attributes powers to an alien force that dominates social affairs.
It is the illusion that money has its own productive powers, particularly in politics, and is
fetishized as having the power to solve problems, believing that without money nothing
can be done. See KARL MARX, CAPITAL 31-37 (Friedrich Engels ed., Samuel Moore,
trans., 1952).
83 See Saich, supra note 64.
84 Indeed, over the past years, flurries of expectant hopes have been repeatedly
frustrated by central leadership inaction, or even worse, by political tightening. Such
dashed hopes were discouraging for reformers, raising a perennial question: how will
China be able to continue transforming itself into a more liberalized and democratic
country? See Karen Halverson, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal and Political
Implications, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 319, 363-65 (2004) (demonstrating the
intractability and inflexibility of China's political reform).
85 Yonehara, supra note 5, at 107-08.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXII
Chinese leadership addressing the need to strengthen legal
institutions86 "that might curb bureaucratic arbitrariness by
defining the scope of administrative authority and providing
remedies for the exercise of arbitrary power.
' 87
During a recent visit to the United States in April 2006,
President Hu Jintao sent an unusual signal at a press conference
with his pledge to adopt democracy in the future.88 Hu pointed out
that, "in the light of China's own national conditions and the will
of the Chinese people, [China will] continue to move ahead [with]
political restructuring and to develop a socialist democracy."'8 9
Unlike all the previous statements of Chinese leaders, which
addressed "China's own national conditions," Hu's statement
emphasized both "China's own national conditions" and "the will
of the Chinese people." 90 While for the time being it is difficult to
decide whether it is a slip of the tongue, a political show, or a
consensus of Chinese leaders, the statement at least shows a
symbolic purpose.
Moreover, market liberalization and the widespread
availability of information over the Internet 9' have already
86 As a symbolic move, China's National People's Congress amended the Chinese
Constitution in 1999 to insert the "rule of law" into that document as a leading principle
for the first time. See XIAN FA art. 5, § 1 (1999) (P.R.C.); see also XLAN FA, amend. III
(1999) (P.R.C.).
87 Lubman, supra note 71, at 392.
88 At a joint press conference following the Hu-Bush Summit in Washington on
April 20, 2006, President Hu noted that China would "continue to move ahead with the
political restructuring and to develop a socialist democracy," and it will "further expand
the orderly participation of the Chinese citizens in political affairs so that the Chinese
citizens will be in a better position to exercise their democratic rights in terms of
democratic supervision, democratic management, and the democratic decision-making."
Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Bush Meets with
President Hu of the People's Republic of China (Apr. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/ p/eap/rls/ot/64895.htm.
89 Id.
90 See Dehao Fang, Hu Jintao Zhenggai Shumoing Cang Xuanji [The Implications
of Hu's Statement Towards Political Reform], ASIAN TIMES, Apr. 24, 2006, avaliable at
http://www.atchinese.com/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id= I 5579&Item
id=47.
91 According to the latest figures released by China Internet Network Information
Centre (CNNIC) in its Semi-annual Survey Report on the Development of the Internet in
China, the number of Chinese Internet users connecting to the Internet over broadband
connections rose by 173% during 2003. See Sumner Lemon, Broadband Internet Usage
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loosened the government's strength in controlling all spheres of
society,92 and the phrase "rule of law" is becoming popular in
Chinese society, particularly among officials and intellectuals.
China's integration into the global trading system and participation
in international rulemaking will profoundly influence Chinese
attitudes and ways of thinking.93  China has become an
institutional laboratory-the largest of its kind in human history-
freighted with enormous implications for the future of the rule of
law. This experiment will inevitably continue, driven by China's
economic prosperity, social challenges, and external integration.94
C. From Marx's Atheism to "Belief Vacuum"
The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, alleged that, in
the same sense that religious toleration depends upon respect for
international law, a stable international order depends upon
religious toleration.95 Freedom of religion is considered by many
to be a fundamental human right.96  The Chinese Constitution
expressly guarantees citizens' right to "freely choose and express
Soars in China, Jan. 16, 2004, http://www.infoworld.com/article/O4/01/16/HNchinanet
usagel.html. In 2003, China was estimated to have 79.5 million Internet users, up
34.5% from 59.1 million users in 2002. See U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, E-Commerce and Development Report 2004, available at http://
www.unctad. org/en/docs/ecdr2004ch len.pdf.
92 See Halverson, supra note 84, at 364-65 (addressing the widespread availability
of information over the Internet as an important factor to limit the government's ability
in controlling the public).
93 See id. at 332 (stating that China's WTO membership will further deepen its
integration into the world economy and strengthen its active role in the international
economic arena).
94 Zhang, supra note 57, at 5.
95 Nathan A. Adams, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty
Beyond the Border, 33 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1, 2 (2000) (citing M.S. MCDOUGAL ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 653, 668 (1980)).
96 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948 at the Palais de Chaillot
in Paris, France, defines freedom of religion and belief as follows: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and
observance." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec.12, 1948), art. 18.
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their religious beliefs" and make clear their religious affiliations.97
Accordingly, both party and government are obligated to create
the legal mechanisms necessary to enforce this constitutional
guarantee. However, the gap between rhetoric and reality is
enormous.
1. Religions Currently Accepted
The Chinese government officially recognizes five religions:
Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism."
According to the official statistics, there are 13,000 Buddhist
temples and about 200,000 Buddhist monks and nuns. 99 Among
them are 120,000 lamas and nuns, more than 1,700 Living
Buddhas, 3,000 temples of Tibetan Buddhism, nearly 10,000
Bhiksu and senior monks, and more than 1,600 temples of Pali
Buddhism. Taoism, which is native to China with a history of
more than 1,700 years, °00 has over 1,500 Taoist temples and more
than 25,000 Taoist priests and nuns."0 l  Islam, which was
introduced to China in the seventh century, presently has ten
national minorities, including the Hui and Uygur, with a total
population of eighteen million. 10 2  Catholicism, which was
introduced into China intermittently in the seventh century and
spread widely until after the opium War in 1840, has more then
four million adherents, 4,000 clergy and more then 5,400 churches
and meeting venues. 1
03
97 The Chinese Constitution stipulates that "citizens of the People's Republic of
China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or
individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion; nor may
they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The
state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in
activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the
educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to
any foreign domination." XIAN FA art. 36 (1999) (P.R.C.).
98 INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN CHINA § 1 (Oct. 1997), available at
http://www.china. org.cn/e-white/Freedom/index.htm.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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2. The Gap with Reality
The Chinese government has demonstrated a continued
unwillingness to allow its citizens to develop freedom of beliefs.
Dominated by socialist atheism, the government views religion as
a perpetuation of feudal superstitions, treats religious groups as a
threat, and places strict limitations on religious organizations.' °4
Currently, national regulations require that both religious
organizations and individual places of worship must register with
the Religious Affairs Bureau, a ministry-level branch of the
Chinese government.105 Often, local regulations are "more
detailed and restrictive than their national-level counterparts .*' °6
While some local officials encourage foreign religious
organizations to work in their communities to supply basic social
services,'0 7 foreign domination over religion in China is strictly
prohibited.° 8 On July 29, 2006, Christian residents in Hangzhou's
Xiaoshan District at China's eastern Zhejiang province clashed
with police after authorities sought to demolish a church that was
deemed unlawful.'0 9 This incident illustrates the government's
ambivalence towards religion. Consequently, many religious
practitioners in China "reject the validity of worshipping in
religious institutions that fall under the auspices of a government
controlled by the officially atheist Communist Party."" 0  Under
such circumstances, some practitioners have no choice but to
abjure their beliefs."' The tight control over religious practice has
isolated Chinese religious believers from the rest of the religious
104 STAFF OF CONG.-EXEC. COMMISSION ON CHINA, 107TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT
16-20 (2002), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/2002annRptEng.pdf.
105 Id. at 16 (citing Regulations on Managing Places for Religious Activities
[Zongliao Huodong Changsuo Guanli Tiaoli], issued on Jan. 31, 1994).
106 Id. at 17.
107 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
LABOR, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2004 (CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET,
HONG KONG, AND MACAU)), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/
35396.htm.
108 STAFF OF CONG.-EXEC. COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 104, at 17 (citing
XIAN FA art. 36 (1999) (P.R.C.)).
109 See China's Christians Resist Church Demolition, REUTERS, July 31, 2006,
available at http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-7-31/44430.html.
110 Id.
III Id.
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world.
As a result, a large percentage of the population, particularly
the youth, lacks religious beliefs and the ethical support that those
beliefs provide. At the same time, with the disintegration of
communism as a means of meeting social aspirations, there are
few followers of the principles of Marxism, resulting in a situation
where China has entered upon a period of belief vacuum. This is a
precarious moment indeed, a time of doubt when the law can do
nothing but wait powerlessly for the advent of real leadership,
with no other ethical system to alleviate the strain.
3. A Syllogistic Implication
As stated in the Bible from Galatians:
A person is justified not by the works of the law but through faith in
Jesus Christ. And we have come to believe in Christ Jesus, so that we
might be justified by faith in Christ, and not by doing the works of the
law, because no one will be justified by the works of the law. 112
The freedom to believe and to practice one's religious faith is
recognized as a universal and essential right. Although religion
and law are usually considered as two distinct sources of morality
operating in different domains, in reality, religious faith and legal
order inevitably interact."l 3 Without religious belief and faith,
there are no developed ethical systems to provide a firm
foundation to enable an enduring belief in law and, as such, no
self-disciplining consciousness to constrain counterfeiting and
piracy.
D. Press Control Policy: "Coin It In Silence"
Freedom of speech is often seen as a one of society's most
valued personal rights.1 4 However, while China has undergone
dramatic economic and social changes, the central government has
endeavored to maintain rigid control over media coverage as a
112 Galatians 2:16.
113 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND
RELIGION 209-20 (1993).
114 Frank S. Sengstock, Achieving a Workable Definition of Free Speech: A
Symposium on the Nature and Scope of the Constitutional Guarantee of Freedom of
Expression, 47 J. URB. L. 395, 396 (1969-1970).
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means of stifling social discontent.'15 China employs an extensive
licensing system to restrict publication of news and opinions on
matters of public concern, and the authorities place severe
restrictions on imported movies, books, and audiovisual
products.1
16
Apart from traditional media, the government has a
longstanding set of policies restricting information and has
particularly attempted to implement controls to prevent the
public's access to politically sensitive information, namely
through the methods of Internet filtering and blocking.'17 A
typical example of this is the government's blocking of Chinese
Internet users' access to the Google and AltaVista search
engines. l l' Recently, Microsoft acknowledged that it was
working, at the Chinese government's request, with Chinese
information officers to censor its new Chinese-language Web
portal and new free Web log tool, MSN Spaces." 9
In China, "freedom of speech" is theoretically protected under
the Constitution.2 ° However, it is not an individual liberty in
practice, but rather a tool for citizens to sing a collective song of
praise. As the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's
115 See He Qinglian, Media Control in China, 4 CHINA RTS. F. 11, 11-16 (2004).
116 For a precise discussion of the rules and regulations of information control
policy in China, see generally, Anna S.F. Lee, The Censorship and Approval Process for
Media Products in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 127
(Mary L. Riley ed., 1997); Mary L. Riley, The Regulation of the Media in China, in
CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND PRACTICE 355 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds.
1999); Peter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, An Attempt to use Shakespeare to
Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B. U. INT'L L.J. 1, 28-32
(2001).
117 See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Empirical Analysis of Internet
Filtering in China, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china (last visited Oct. 29,
2006).
118 See Jason Deans, Chinese Government Backs down on Google, THE GUARDIAN,
Sept. 13, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/internetnews/story/0,736
9,791772,00.html (describing how China's government ended its two-week block on
Chinese subjects using the internet search engine Google).
119 Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, U.S. Tech Firms Help Governments Censor Internet,
FOXNews.com, July 19, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,162781,00.html.
120 According to Article 35 of Chinese Constitution, Chinese citizens "enjoy
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of
demonstration." XIAN FA art. 35 (1999) (P.R.C.).
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report stated, the "PRC government has transformed the
constitutional right of freedom of speech into a political privilege
of 'freer' speech for the ideological elite." 121 Further, the Chinese
legal system "discourages the free flow of information, not only
by erecting barriers to non-government-controlled institutions, but
also by encouraging individual self-censorship by not clearly
defining what constitutes protected speech."' 122 Those who are
allowed to publish confront a legal system that obscures the
boundaries of freedom of speech, so that many Chinese are
vulnerable to publish information that authorities might deem
sensitive. 123 As a result, "coin it in silence" (men shengfa da cai),
which means making fortunes quietly without being associated
with politics, has been a motto for many Chinese in their attempts
to survive and adapt in an uncertain world. As such, the media
business and the publishing industry remain the most heavily
regulated industries in China. 1
24
Due to the stringent information control and self-censorship
policy, cultural products are in great demand in the Chinese
market. 125  Often, consumers have to settle for black market
products, which can saturate the cultural market. 126 Even though
the market is finally open, it will need much time to overcome the
entrenched inertia of old custom.
E. Ignorance of the Notion of Private Rights
Private property rights are among the fundamental concepts
upon which many Western states are built and intellectual property
rights were born of a predominantly Western concept of private
property rights and benefits. 127  At the international level, the
objective of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement (TRIPs) is to support liberalization of the
121 STAFF OF CONG-EXEC. COMMISSION ON CHINA, 107TH CONG., ISSUE REPORT ON
INFORMATION CONTROL AND SELF-CENSORSHIP IN THE PRC AND THE SPREAD OF SARS 10
(May 7, 2003), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/prcControlSARS.pdf.
122 Id at 6.
123 Id.
124 See Lee, supra note 116, at 127.
125 Yu, supra note 2, at 24.
126 Id. at 31.
127 Griffin, supra note 2, at 182.
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international trading system while protecting the private monopoly
rights of intellectual property owners by reducing piracy and
eliminating of "free-riding."' 28  The preamble of the TRIPs
Agreement highlights these objectives by explicitly emphasizing
the need to protect private interests by committing members to a
shared objective of "desiring to reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade, and taking into account the
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights."' 29
In contrast to Western notions of property rights, Communism,
the extraordinary social experiment promising equality and
freedom in the twentieth century, substantially impacted cultural
perceptions in modem China. As noted by Robert Weatherly, Karl
Marx deemed the individual to be a "species being" who exists as
an intrinsic part of the society to which he or she was born. 30
Influenced by communist ideology, Chinese society has
traditionally viewed private rights as a form of individualization,
which is considered wicked and vicious. 13 1  Unlike the
constitutions in most developed countries, which hold sacred the
individual's rights, emphasizing their abstract and universal
nature, the Constitution of China does not address IPR. 132 In
addition, Chinese justice is "geared towards the settlement of
specific disputes rather than defining the claims for individual
rights."' 33 Although Marxist fundamentalism has been loosened
by the new "pragmatic" Chinese leadership, the legacy of
128 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs].
129 Id. at pmbl.
130 ROBERT WEATHERLEY, THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: HISTORICAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 93, 104 (1999) (examining the relationship between
private individual rights and the superiority of collective interests under the Marxist
ideology).
131 Indeed, in Chinese society, values to the individual are secondary to the values
that would accrue to the community. While China is gradually re-introducing notions of
private ownership, the process is likely to be time-consuming. See id. at 93.
132 LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA: EXEMPLIFIED BY 190 CH'ING DYNASTY CASES 18-21
(Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris eds., 1967).
133 Fung, supra note 2, at 615.
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communitarian thought has a certain amount of inertia. The
prevailing point of view in China is that rights are bestowed by the
State rather than being natural, inalienable rights enjoyed by
individuals. 134
A notable characteristic of China's legal landscape is the
government's establishment of the interrelated doctrines of legal
equality and political inequality in the context of civil
obligations.'35 It is apparent that Chinese people do not, or dare
not, believe that individuals are endowed with rights that they are
entitled to assert, particularly with respect to those in positions of
authority. 3 6  The comprehension of general private rights is
nascent and, as such, the legislation for protecting them is in some
senses rudimentary. Despite the introduction of a 2004
amendment to China's Constitution that would provide protection
to private property, 37 China still has a long way to go in order to
fully protect private rights, such as integrating the amended
provisions into existent laws and regulations. The lack of rights
consciousness illustrates, at least in part, how Western legal
notions are incommensurable with Chinese sensibilities. 38
In contrast, China has been engaged in intellectual property
protection for over two decades, which has resulted in
comprehensive and substantive legislation. 139  The protection of
IPR preceded recognition of the general private rights. China has
134 WEATHERLEY, supra note 127, at 118.
135 Scott J. Palmer, An Identity Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and the Politics of
Intellectual Property Rights in China, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LE. STUD. 449, 456 (2001).
136 See ALFORD, supra note 2, at 117 (stating that there has been a lack of "rights
consciousness" in China).
137 On March 14, 2004, China's National Peoples Congress adopted a series of long-
awaited amendments to the state constitution, including landmark provisions that refer to
protection of human rights and private property rights. For example, Article 33 of the
Chinese Constitution has a third paragraph inserted, which reads "The State respects and
preserves human rights." XiAN FA art. 33 (1999) (P.R.C.); see also XIAN FA, amend. IV.
138 Palmer, supra note 132, at 475-76.
139 For example, the 1990s witnessed a wave of significant legal reform. Chinese
Copyright Law was legislated in 1990, and Patent and Trademark Laws, which were
promulgated one decade ago, were significantly amended in 1992 and 1993 respectively.
During this period China also actively participated in IPR conventions and activities
sponsored by related international organizations. For a recent and comprehensive
account of Chinese intellectual property law, see PETER GANEA ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA (2005).
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thus spawned a modem amalgam-China's remarkable
intellectual property regime has been inoculated whereas the
notion of private rights is still in its infancy.
Within this context, the commitment to protection of LPR
cannot be regarded as unalterable. Establishing a substantive
private rights system in China and giving its citizenry private
property rights are by no means a quick or easy solution to China's
IPR enforcement problem. They should be regarded as long-term
policies that need to be underpinned in order to create a sound
basis for further economic development.
III. Insight into the Economic Spectrum
As China scholar Frederick Abbott asserts, the piracy of
intellectual property fuels economic development until the country
reaches the point where IPR protection becomes economically
advantageous to a sufficiently strong set of domestic vested
interests. 4 ° Within the global trading system, if a country is not
economically ready to change its economic behavior, the risky
strategy for stronger demands will only turn into a tragic legal
failure.' 4' Obviously, China remains a consumer of intellectual
property and is therefore unlikely to see gains from the vigorous
protection of IPR, instead profits will result from the imitation of
existing products. 14
2
A. Market Impetus: A Nationwide Shadow Economy
The most striking economic feature of counterfeiting and
piracy is that the original products which are being counterfeited
and pirated are expensive to create but inexpensive to copy. 143 At
the same time, a considerable gap exists between the retail prices
of the pirate and legitimate products, which enable the pirates to
140 See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPs Agreement and Global Economic
Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION 3, 4-12
(1997).
141 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 364 (1993).
142 See Michael Yeh, Up Against a Great Wall: The Fight Against Intellectual
Property Piracy in China, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 195, 214 (1996).
143 Glenn R. Butterton, Norms and Property in the Middle Kingdom, 15 WlS. INT'L
L.J. 281, 293 (1997).
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capture market share from the legitimate producers.'" Under this
scenario, it is no exaggeration that counterfeiting and piracy have
developed into a nationwide shadow economy that contributes to
the national economy.'45 Eliminating this shadow economy would
mean depriving communities of literally hundreds of jobs. 146 The
temptation of large profits, little capital, and vast opportunities for
employment is a difficult combination to resist.147 By some
estimates, piracy directly or indirectly employs three million to
five million people, and provides national income of between
nineteen and twenty-four billion dollars.'48 This is becoming more
visible as China deepens its reforms and, together with a lack of
enthusiasm by local authorities, threatens the stability of any
initiative towards progress.149
Mainly due to economic decentralization, the infringement of
counterfeiting and piracy occurs especially at the local levels,
where it supports local economies. '° Shutting down
counterfeiting and piracy means, in many instances, cracking
down a pillar of a cornerstone industry that will bring about
144 Id. at 294.
145 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 12 (July 1,
2005) (stating that counterfeit goods are estimated to account for approximately 8% of
China's GDP); see also Press Release, European Commission, EU Strategy to Enforce
Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries-Facts and Figures (Nov. 10, 2004),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc_119898.pdf
(noting that around 15-20% of all brand products sold in China are fakes, and that the
portion has risen significantly in recent years).
146 Chen, supra note 2, at 17.
147 See WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Transitional Review Mechanism of China, Communication from the European
Communities and their Member States, IP/C/W371 (Aug. 29, 2002).
148 See Robert Marquand, China's Pirate Industry Thriving, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 9, 2002, at 6. According to the Report of China State Counsel
Development Research Centre, the estimated market value of counterfeit goods made in
China was from $19 billion to $24 billion in 2001, which could well be a conservative
figure. See China Faces Uphill Battle against Counterfeits, PEOPLES DAILY ONLINE,
July 23, 2003, http://english.people.com.cn/200307/23/eng20030723_120820.shtml.
149 In the context of IPR enforcement, it is not surprising that the central
government often works in earnest while local authorities remain unconvinced that
results will follow. As a result, the central government faces domestic resistance in its
effort to promote IPR protection.
150 See Willard, supra note 6, at 429-30 (illustrating the role of regionalism and
impact of infringing activities by government owned entities).
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problems of unemployment, dislocation, and social chaos, which
are problems that the Chinese government monitors closely.' 5
B. Stage Theory for IPR Protection
An economy must reach a certain stage of overall development
before it can commit substantial resources to research and
development. 5 2 As noted by John Allison and Lianlian Lin, "all
developing countries pass through a stage of development where
copying of products is widespread."' 53  Both the United States
15 4
and Japan 55 have passed through similar stages.
The development of the United States in the nineteenth century
was largely based on the adoption of technological, economic, and
legal policies from England and France. 5 6 It was not until 1783
that the first legislation was adopted in Connecticut that addressed
copyright issues. 157  Between 1800 and 1860, almost half of the
151 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 19 (mentioning that the local authorities remain
unwilling to enforce laws against local business pillars which serve as important sources
of local revenue).
152 Allison & Lin, supra note 25, at 775.
153 Douglas Clark, Intellectual Property Rights Protection Will Improve in China
Eventually, CHINA Bus. REV., 22, 29 (2000); see also Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical
Assessment of the US-China Conflict on Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
295, 300 (1996) (demonstrating the fact that the industrializing countries often borrow
many things, from technology to legal concepts, from industrialized countries).
154 Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-
Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L. J. 1050, 1051 (1968) ("[U]ntil the Second World
War the United States had little reason to take pride in its international copyright
relations; but rather, [in fact, it] had a great deal to be ashamed of."); see also Teresa
Watanabe, Japan Sets Sights on Creativity, L. A. TIMES, June 10, 1990, Al, A36
(mentioning that United States passed a stage in copying European technology in its
early years).
155 See Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection
Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say 'Property'? A
Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 316
(1996) ("[Olne commentator, Teresa Watanabe states the total price Japan had to pay for
the Western technology it needed to transform itself from a nation of ricepaper and
bamboo to transistors and skyscrapers was a bargain-basement $9 billion."); see also Pat
CHOATE, HOT PROPERTY: THE STEALING OF IDEAS IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 138-68
(2005) (arguing that the United States, the major promoter of establishment of world
intellectual property system, is not blameless in the realm of idea theft in a historical
perspective).
156 Endeshaw, supra note 150, at 300.
157 Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 338 (2003).
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bestsellers in the United States were pirated, mostly from English
novels. 58 Today, with its rapidly growing economic strength and
technological sophistication, the United States is no longer the
"notorious pirate" it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries; rather, it has been converted from the most "notorious
pirate to the most dreadful police."'
159
The American domestic entrepreneurs were "notorious pirates
of British works of intellectual property,' 160 as were the
Japanese. 16' The experience of imitation in China was similar to
that of European countries before the emergence of the
contemporary notion of authorship in the eighteenth century, as
well as the United States in the nineteenth century, and Japan in
twentieth century. 162 China is "not alone in its apparent inability to
surmount obstacles to effective intellectual property protection,"
and the IPR enforcement problem in China is not unique. 163 To
speed up this process will undermine the developmental bulwark,
but beyond a certain point, allowing it to continue will also hinder
economic growth.
Counterfeiting and piracy are special types of market
transactions, where demand meets supply. In order to harness the
limited purchasing power of low-income citizens, Chinese
authorities often turn a blind eye to counterfeiting, because it is an
insurmountable problem in the early stages of development."
Despite its dramatic economic development, China's per capita
GDP of $5,000 ranks one-hundred and twenty-second in the
158 Id. at 341 (citing S.M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS § 2.18 at 25 (2d ed. 1989)).
159 Id. at 353.
160 Griffin, supra note 2, at 187.
161 See infra notes 170-209 for a detailed discussion.
162 See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT (1993); MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET:
REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (1994) (examining the modem concepts of art,
authorship and copyright which arose in Europe during the late eighteenth century).
163 Warren Newberry, Copyright Reform in China: A 'TRIPs' Much Shorter and
Less Strange Than Imagined? 35 CONN. L. REv. 1425, 1447 (2003).
164 See e.g., Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1998, at DI (noting that Chinese custom officials pose little threat to copyright
pirates).
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world. 165 At such an undeveloped level, there is no exception to
passing through this stage in China, although it may be possible to
gain faster development and thus accelerate the process of
transition.
C. Outlook For IPR Protection in China
Prospectively speaking, there should be an adaptive phase
before China's WTO accession will eventually result in the
removal of the various impediments to an effective IPR
enforcement regime and lead to a noticeable decrease in IPR
infringement. In the short term, some predict that there may be an
increase in the number of infringements, 166 since China's efforts to
create an internationally competitive free market economy have
simultaneously created an illegal market of counterfeits, 16 and
"unleashed a flood of products, both genuine and counterfeit, into
the world market."'' 68 China's WTO accession will further boost
its economic growth and foreign trade, including the trade of
counterfeited and pirated goods.
69
At this transitional period in its development, China will need
time to phase-in effective policies. During this period, if no
politically influential domestic constituency favors the new
policies, one can only expect non-implementation and robust
domestic resistance. In the future, however, China's WTO
accession should lead to a decrease in the infringement of IPR.
This decrease is likely because the growth of intellectual property
infringement in China has "paralleled the growth of China's
economy and Chinese companies' greater access to domestic and
international markets" - both of which will continue to grow with
WTO membership." 0  When economic growth creates the
165 THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK 2004 115 (2004).
166 See CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES REPORT, STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF
MOVIE PIRACY ON CHINA'S ECONOMY, available at http://www.uschina.org/public/
documents/2006/07/cass-piracyimpact-e.pdf (showing that 61% of Chinese believed
that piracy will continue to increase while 39% believed that piracy levels will remain
steady and none expects the market for pirated movies to shrink in the immediate future).
167 Yu, supra note 154, at 372-73.
168 Clark, supra note 150, at 130.
169 Id.
170 Id.
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development of more sophisticated and competitive home grown
enterprises, and the domestic enterprises display entrepreneurial
enthusiasm to protect their own IPR, the intellectual property
infringement levels will reach a plateau and start to decrease.
IV. The Stones from Other Hills: Experiences of Japan and
Korea
As another Chinese phrase says, "The stones from other hills
may serve to polish the jade" (ta shan zhi shi ke yi gong yu)."T
East and Southeast Asian countries are heavily influenced by
Confucian values and have also been the "scene of a tremendous
shift of technology and wealth from West to East."1 7
2
Accordingly, this article draws on the experience of other regional
states, which not only share the same, or similar, cultural values to
those found in China, but have also developed domestic standards
of IPR protection. Of these, Japan and Korea are notable for their
cultural similarities with China and their high levels of intellectual
property protection.
A. The Japanese Experience
On one hand, Confucian norms of social harmony and moral
precepts have permeated the intellectual life of Japanese citizens
and have played a pivotal role in molding the Japanese culture as it
exists today. On the other hand, Japan's economic progress is
closely tied to its effective intellectual property policy and
management. If China is to start a new process for its IPR
protection, it is worthwhile to model its process after those who
have had similar experience.
1. A Glance Back at Japan's IP Law and Policy
In Japan, economic development has been linked from the very
start to the introduction of industrial property rights.173 The Meiji
regime established in 1868 quickly discarded the feudal system
171 GRAND CHINESE DICTIONARY [Hanyu Da Cidian], V1, 1155 (Shanghai 1994).
172 Vaughan, supra note 155, at 316.
173 See Christopher Heath, Intellectual Property Rights in Asia-Projects,
Programmes and Developments, ONLINE PUBLICATION OF MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION AND TAx LAW (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
[Vol. XXI
2006] CULTURAL PERPLEXITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 33
and launched a comprehensive program of reform that
significantly changed Japanese society. 74  During the Meiji
Restoration, a revolution in Japan which "restored" imperial rule
and transformed Japan from a feudal society into a modern state,
legal systems, sciences, and technology were introduced from
Western Europe and North America. 175 The rapid growth of the
1960s was made possible in large part by the introduction of
foreign technology.
7 6
While the Japanese regime in 1721 issued a decree that made
inventions a criminal offense, the first statute of monopolies was
introduced in 1872 after Emperor Meiji had declared that both the
administration and the population in Japan should commit
themselves to making Japan an advanced nation.177 At the end of
the nineteenth century, Japan became a member of both the Paris
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne
Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.1 78 Japan
thus paved the way for systemic legislation that indicated that IPR
should play an important role in the country's national
industrialization and cultural renaissance.
In terms of the legislation, although Japan has enjoyed the
longest tradition of IPR in Asia with a comparatively affirmed
notion of intellectual property laws, it only serves to illustrate the
174 Id.
175 CAROL GLUCK, JAPAN'S MODERN MYTHS, IDEOLOGY IN THE LATE MEUI PERIOD
17-23 (1985).
176 See MICHIO MORISHIMA, WHY HAS JAPAN 'SUCCEEDED'? WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
AND THE JAPANESE ETHOS 58-63, 160-67 (1982) (stating that, since the Meiji Restoration,
Japan has had extensive contacts with the West, through which Japan broke with a long
history of isolationism and paved the way for the adoption of western technologies).
177 See Heath, supra note 173.
178 Consensus on an appropriate international mechanism to enable this was initiated
in the last quarter of the 19th century with the main pillars being the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property (originally signed in 1883) and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work (originally signed in 1886).
See The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 211 (last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971). For a
detailed introduction concerning these two unions, see Robert J. Pechman, Seeking
Multilateral Protection for Intellectual Property: The United States "TRIPS" Over
Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179, 181-84 (1998).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
early development of the Japanese economy. 7 9 In fact, it is not
surprising that Japan's IPR legal regime had long been
characterized as a diffusion of knowledge rather than a facilitating
innovation. 180  The first Director-General of the Japanese
Trademark Registration and the Patent Office, the truly
remarkable Korekiyo Takahashi, who became Prime Minister in
1921, wrote in his autobiography when visiting the United States
Patent institutions in Washington DC, around the year 1900: "We
have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that
we can be like them. We said: 'What is it that makes the United
States such a great nation?['] And we investigated and found that
it was patents and so we will have patents."' 81 Interestingly, the
major driving force for developing a Western-style IPR legal
system in Japan during the Meiji Period was to promote Japan to
become "an advanced nation," as Emperor Meiji wished, or
facilitate it into "a greatest nation," as Premier Takahashi
expected. The nationwide transplantation of an exotic intellectual
property system in Japan was virtually a massive copying activity
reflected by an ingrained habit of imitation.
Due to the lack of economic underpinnings for a strong IPR
protection, during the early phase of economic development,
compulsory licensing was frequently required for a patent holder
and, "until 1938 a patent could expire in practice if the patent
holder did not use the patent."' 82 In the 1960s, the United States
Patent Office normally approved or disapproved an application for
a patent within eighteen months.183  In contrast, it took the
179 See Heath, supra note 173.
180 See Koichi Hamada, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Japan
(Council of Foreign Relations, Working Paper, Apr. 1996) (maintaining that Japan's IPR
related legal system emphasized the "diffusion of foreign knowledge rather than creating
its own"), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/hkiO1/.
181 David Vaver, The Future of Intellectual Property Law: Japanese and European
Perspectives Compared I (Working Papers of Oxford IP Research Centre, Working
Paper No. 09/99), available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/DVWP0999.pdf; see also
Intellectual Property Policy Outline, Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, July 3,
2002, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/kettei/020703taikou
_e.html (illustrating that the ambitions and strategies of the Japanese government are to
make Japan "a nation built on intellectual property").
182 Hamada, supra note 180.
183 Vaughan, supra note 155, at 347.
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Japanese Patent Office (JPO) an average of five to seven years, 84
with the Kilby patent case being an important example. 85  Also,
the JPO required "full disclosure of the technology submitted in
the application for the accommodation of imitation."' 86  In
addition, although Japan had joined the Paris Union on July 15,
1899, as recently as the 1990s, the duration of patents in Japan
could be shorter than twenty years, which is the minimum duration
agreed to in the TRIPs Agreement. 87 It was not until 1994 that
patent law was amended and improved to guarantee at least 20
years after the application for the patent.
88
Strong IPR protection only came into being in Japan when
external pressure was created by the United States and lobbying
pressure was raised by the domestic industrial sectors. In this
sense, it was only recently that Japan substantially came into
harmony with international standards and embarked on a national
undertaking with a view to the construction of a nation built on
intellectual property. 1
89
184 Id.
185 For a substantive introduction of and comment on the Kilby case, see id.; Dana
Rohrabacher and Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 263, 265 (1995) ("In 1961, Texas Instruments filed the basic patent in Japan for
the integrated circuit, known as the 'Kilby patent' after its inventor, Jack Kilby. The
JPO required that the application be divided into fourteen separate parts of which twelve
were ultimately rejected. The first patent was not granted until 1977, approximately
seventeen years after it was filed "during which time the Japanese semiconductor
industry copied and export large quantities of chip products, earning billions of dollars in
profit").
186 Vaughan, supra note 155, at 347.
187 Hamada, supra note 180.
188 Id.
189 Since 2002, Japanese government has introduced various institutional reforms in
the area of intellectual property. The work has been promoted in accordance with the
"Intellectual Property Policy Outline" in July 2002 and the "Strategic Program for the
Creation, Protection and Exploitation of Intellectual Property" in July 2003, which
defined concrete measures the government should take and priorities in establishing a
"nation built on intellectual property" where intellectual property is used to create high-
value added products and services with the aim of revitalizing the economy and society.
See Intellectual Property Outline, supra note 181; Strategic Program for the Creation,
Protection and Exploitation of Intellectual Property, Intellectual Property Policy
Headquarters, July 8, 2003, available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/APCITY/UNPAN017539.pdf.
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2. Confucian Values and Intellectual Creation
In Japan, identifiable signs of Confucian values are numerous.
The Japanese believe in a social and hierarchical order and
collectivist ideology.' 90 The character of Confucianism in Japan is
much more significant than that in China.' 91 For example, in
Japan an employer can be treated as the author of a work that is
completed by an employee on the job.' 92 In Europe, this system
would be unacceptable.' 93 The European employer will, as in
Japan, usually own the copyright, but the status of author is
reserved to the human being who actually makes the work rather
than the entity which pays for the creation.194 The European view
"emphasizes the individual, rather than the organization to which
he or she belongs,"' 95 but the "Japanese rule emphasizes the
importance of the organization, cooperation[,] and teamwork,
rather than the individual."' 196 Each view has a logic and history
shaped by the culture in which it is embedded. However, within
the diversity of its culture, each economy attempts to reach the
same goal by different routes. The infrastructure of Confucian
philosophy, based on the cardinal relationship and hierarchical
order, has played a significant role in Japanese economic
development' 97 and contributed substantially to its economic
miracle after the Second World War. 198 Japan's economic success
demonstrates that Confucian values can act and have acted as a
positive role in its economic and cultural prosperity.' 99
190 Troyer, supra note 23, at 45, 51-52; see also Gluck, supra note 175, at 258-59.
191 Gluck, supra note 175, at 259.
192 Vaver, supra note 181, at 5.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 See Gluck, supra note 175, at 258-59, 286.
198 MORISHIMA, supra note 176, at 3-7.
199 Id. (explaining the importance of the role played in the creation of Japanese
capitalism by ethical doctrines as transformed under Japanese conditions, especially the
Confucian ethics of complete loyalty to the firm and to the state).
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3. Tolerant IPR Policy and Economic Blooming
During the Second World War, Japan received foreign aid
from Western Europe and the United States and had to rebuild
from the ashes of war. This aid enabled Japan to obtain necessary
investment and technology without having to build a sound
intellectual property environment. Japan has "garnered the lion's
share of this wealth" transfer from the West and has
"accomplished this while in the course of converting itself from a
country devastated by allied bombing during World War II into an
industrial giant.,
20 0
During the rehabilitation period, Japan's "meteoric
technological rise was not based on Japanese innovation, but on
the imitation of Western ideas., 201 Based on this, Japan enjoyed a
high level of prosperity by "providing cheap, high-quality, mass-
produced products to the world. 20 2 During the two big oil crises
in 1973 and 1975, Japan showed remarkable resilience.2 3 Japan
has "carefully orchestrated its economy to keep out foreign
imports while encouraging the copying of Western technology.
20 4
Within this context, the Japanese government applied a
relatively tolerant intellectual property enforcement policy and, as
a result, counterfeiting and piracy were very common. It was
during the postwar period that Japan seized a valuable
developmental opportunity. In 1953, less than a decade after the
war, the Japanese were able to overcome the devastation of the
war, and exceed pre-war levels of prosperity. 20 5 At the beginning
of the 1960s, the Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda launched
his ambitious "doubling the income" plan. 2 6  Then, at the
centennial of the Meiji restoration, when China was under a
violent storm of Cultural Revolution, Japan's GNP climbed
200 Vaughan, supra note 155, at 346; see also Gluck, supra note 175, at 258-59.
201 Vaughan, supra note 155, at 346.
202 Intellectual Property Policy Outline, supra note 181.
203 See EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 270-75 (4th ed.
1989).
204 Vaughan, supra note 155, at 316.
205 Hamada, supra note 180, at 4. See generally SHOTARO ISHINOMORI, JAPAN INC.:
AN INTRODUCTION To JAPANESE ECONOMICS (Betsey Scheiner trans.) (1988) (discussing
the post-war Japanese economic miracles).
206 See Hamada, supra note 180, at 7.
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dramatically to become the second largest in the world, surpassing
West Germany.2°7 It comes as no surprise that Japan did nothing
different than what the United States did in copying European
technology in its early years.2"8
Japan's economic miracle led to a transition towards stronger
intellectual property protection in response to lobbying groups
within specific domestic sectors.2 °" As a major example, Yoshida
Kogyo KK, famous maker of YKK zippers, found counterfeit
YKK zippers imported from Korea and initiated a protracted six-
year lawsuit against the copiers.21° Since then, the Japanese
Ministry of Finance has organized the "Customs Information
Centre," a "watchdog unit to monitor illicit copying" and to
"combat intellectual property infringement."2 1  This gradually
became more pervasive, and counterfeits of Japanese origin had
almost entirely disappeared by 1970 due to the stringent efforts of
the Japanese government to crack down on counterfeit goods and
the steady growth of the local economy.212 However, a period of
reversal was noticeable in the mid-1970s when Japan "faced a
resurgence of counterfeit goods that flooded into the Japanese
market. 213 Notably, the rebound phenomenon occurred during the
recession, on the heels of the oil crisis in the 1970s.
B. The Korean Experience
Like Japan, the Republic of Korea (Korea) is what might be
called a typical Confucian country. Confucianism was introduced
into Korea during the era of the Three Kingdoms (57 BCE-668
CE),21 4 and achieved status as the major political ideology and
207 Id. at 7.
208 Vaughan, supra note 155, at 316-17.
209 See ISHINOMORI, supra note 205.
210 See Vaughan, supra note 155, at 349.
211 Id.
212 Masashi Kurose, Law Strengthened to Fight Flow of Counterfeit Goods,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (Japan Special Focus), Mar. 2004, at xii, xii.
213 Id.
214 In Korea, Confucianism has been integrated into Korean culture for a long time.
The Three Kingdoms, Koguryo (37 BCE-668 CE), Paekche (18 BCE-660 CE) and Silla
(57 BCE-935 CE), all left records that indicate the early existence of Confucian
influence. See Key P. Yang & Gregory Henderson, An Outline History of Korean
Confucianism: Part I: The Early Period and Yi Factionalism, 18 J. ASIAN STUD. 82, 82-
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social system with the establishment of the Yi dynasty (1392-19 10
CE).21 5 Confucianism in Korea is a conservative tradition, which
has strongly captured people's minds and imposed rules, models,
and beliefs, while serving as a blueprint for integrating Korean
social lives.216
1. "Eastern Decorum" and Economic Miracle
Korean culture retains a strictly observed Confucian element.
The traditional Confucian social structure, although changing, is
still prevalent in modem Korean society.El7 Confucianism was
accepted so eagerly and in so strict a form that the Chinese
regarded the Korean adherents as more virtuous than
themselves.218 The Chinese see Korea as the "country of Eastern
decorum," referring to the "punctiliousness with which the
Koreans observed all phases of the doctrinal ritual. 219
Although this point of view is of some historical interest, more
relevant to the discussion at hand is to what extent Confucian
norms are presented in contemporary Korean society. Koreans
value harmony, reverence for age, social stability, a respect for
learning, and motivational force, and tend to be obedient in
hierarchical orders, which appear to be compatible with dynamic
84 (1958).
215 The Confucianism which the Yi dynasty adopted is known as Neo-Confucianism.
The Neo-Confucianism began in the period of the Song dynasty (960-1279 AD) in
China. See CHINA: A HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 230.
216 Kwang Kyu Lee, Confucian Tradition in the Contemporary Korean Family, in
CONFUCIANISM AND THE FAMILY 249, 249-64 (Walter H. Slote & George A. De Vos eds.,
1998). See generally DENISE POTRZEBA LETT, IN PURSUIT OF STATUS: THE MAKING OF
SOUTH KOREA'S "NEw" URBAN MIDDLE CLASS (1998) (providing a detailed account of
contemporary South Korean society in the context of Confucian traditions).
217 See Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Laws and Freedom of the Press: South Korea and
Japan Reexamined, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 53, 78 (1990) (describing Confucian ethics in
Korea as still prevailing).
218 See LETT, supra note 212, at 2-6; see also P. Newman, The Confucian Ethic: A
System of Ideals in Korea, Social Studies, Comparative Religion, at 225-27 (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation), available
at http://www.koreasociety.org/MAIN/KS-LessonPlans/Lessons/klp-xxv.pdf (last
visited Oct. 29, 2006).
219 A Window on Korea: Belief Philosophy and Religion, ASNIC online,
http://asnic.utexas.edu/asnic/countrieskorea/beliefsystem.htnl (last visited Oct. 29,
2006).
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entrepreneurship in Korea.22° Confucian culture provides the tools
with which Koreans interpret and give order to the world around
them.22 1 It is a common point of view in Korea that the deeply
ingrained Confucian mode of manners and social relations is still a
predominant factor in interpersonal relations, organizational
structures, and economic life.222 As a developing nation, Korea
has obtained a positive response based on its ability to retain
traditional values while establishing its domestic industries.223 It is
an interesting phenomenon that the upsurge of interest in
Confucian studies in East and Southeast Asian countries for the
last few decades has generated a new dynamism -in the Confucian
tradition, paving the way for the emergence of the "third epoch" of
Confucian humanism.
2 4
2. Weak IPR Protection and "Development Policy"
Traditionally speaking, Korea has not been a nation with an
intellectual property notion in the modem sense.22 5 Intellectual
220 See CHOONG SOON KIM, THE CULTURE OF KOREAN INDUSTRY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY
OF POONGSAN CORPORATION 57-59 (1992) (asserting, through an empirical study of
Poongsan Corporation, that cultural characteristics of the Korean industrial success
originate from Confucianism).
221 See Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture, and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 253, 257 (2003) (asserting that Confucianism is multi-faceted and may mean
different things to different audiences); William Shaw, Rights, Culture, and Policy: The
Prevailing Model, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES
1, 1-22 (William Shaw ed., 1991) (stating Confucianism provides the people with signs,
symbols, and strategies: the tools with which to negotiate the world around them).
222 See Hahm, supra note 221, at 268. The author highlights developments on the
peninsula beginning from end of the nineteenth century: the decline of Confucianism as
a "living political philosophy" that began in the 1880s and sharply accelerated after the
loss of Korean independence in 1910; the growth during the same period of "alternative
philosophical, religious, or political traditions; the "militarized government and social
control" by the Japanese from 1910 to 1945; and the "large, often politically significant
military establishment since 1945." Id.
223 After the 1960s, Korea found its role followed the Japanese example and
developed into one of the "Four Mini Dragons." Statistics show that "four decades ago
[Korean] GDP per capita was comparable with levels in the poorer countries of Africa
and Asia." Today its GDP per capita is seven times India's, sixteen times North Korea,
and is "comparable to the lesser economies of the EU." See THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK 297,300 (2004).
224 See Newman, supra note 218, at 225-27.
225 Id.
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property conceived and developed in Korea has long been
regarded as an entrepreneurial device to attract investment and
transfer of technology, and, similar to Japan, royalty payments
have been a major element of the balance of payment. As a result,
the effectiveness of Korea's government in keeping the integrity
of IPR is incoherent. For example, the government requires very
specific product information in order to provide certification of
IPR, and this information needs to remain contained.226
In addition, the Korean government has applied a flexible
intellectual property policy of incorporation of imitation into its
"national development" and for a long time been considered as an
example of a state in which "piracy" was regarded as merely a
benign form of technology transfer." 7 Accordingly, until the late
1980s, Korea had no effective IPR enforcement. For example,
during the 1970s and early 1980s, Korea was almost entirely an
importer of technology from developed countries, particularly
from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe.228 The heavy
dependence on Japanese technology has resulted in the fact that
Korea shares similar industrial advantages, such as the automobile
and electronic industries.229 Were it not for such tolerant IPR, it
would not have been possible for local enterprises to have
achieved such success. 230 This practice has made tremendous
contributions to Korea's economic boom.
In the area of IPR protection, Korea has had a similar
experience to China and both have been repeatedly criticized by
the United States. Korea was elevated to the Priority Watch List
in the 2003 Special 301 Report of the U.S. Trade Representatives,
which highlighted a series of continued concerns regarding the
lack of adequate protection and enforcement of intellectual
property, particularly the growth of online music piracy and
226 Id.
227 See Linsu Kim, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights: The
Korean Experience, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 1 (June 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/iprs/
CS kim.pdf.
228 Walter Arnold, Science and Technology Department in Taiwan and South
Korea, 28 ASIAN SURV. 440 (1988).
229 Kim, supra note 227.
230 See id. at 7-8.
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continued piracy of United States' motion pictures.23" ' Under
external pressure, Korea has seen a major overhaul of its PR
regulations influenced by the TRIPs Agreement, and has furnished
itself with relatively good intellectual property legislation and
reasonable enforcement mechanisms.232
3. From "Breaking" to "Preaching:" Role Shift in IPR
Protection
Similar to the experience of Japan, the incorporation of piracy
into "national development" policies facilitated domestic
industrialization and related economic growth in Korea. However,
by accumulating sufficient indigenous capabilities with extensive
science and technology infrastructures, these two countries
reached the later stage of the technological development where
PR protection became an important element in domestic industrial
activities.233 Japan and Korea "could not have achieved their
current levels of technological sophistication if strong IPR regimes
had been imposed on them during the early stage of their
industrialization. 234  The same principle applied to the United
States and Western Europe during their respective
industrializations .235
With the development of greater technological sophistication,
more and more Korean companies consider IPR as an important
part of the successful commercialization of their products and
have made considerable investments into research and
development.236 Research and development investment has seen a
"quantum jump" from $28.6 million in 1971 to $4.7 billion by
231 See United States Trade Representative Special 301 Priority Watch List (2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/ReportsPublications/2004/2004_Special_301/S
pecial_30 lPriority-WatchList.html.
232 Heath, supra note 173.
233 Kim, supra note 227, at 5.
234 Id. at 7.
235 Id.
236 For example, for the last decade Samsung invested $35 billion on R&D.
Samsung has recently launched an ambitious plan to spend $45 billion over the next five
years on R&D, starting in November 2005. See Samsung Group Announces Investment
Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2005, available at http://www.marinelink.com/
Story/ShowStory.aspx?StorylD=200804.
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1990, and to $12.2 billion by 2000.237 During this period, the
Korean economy recorded one of the world's fastest growth
rates.238  As a percentage of GDP, research and development
increased from 0.32 percent to 2.68 percent during the same
period, surpassing that of many Western European countries. 9
Korean companies have acted as enthusiastic advocators and
effective preachers for appropriate protection for IPR. 24° As
Samsung and LG have become globally competitive in the
technology sector, the Korean government has at last found
leverage to punish counterfeiting and piracy and to protect IPR
with an effective system of enforcement. Korea, one of the long-
time leaders in piracy practices, came to understand the bite of
illegal copying and has now become a genuine believer and
supporter of IPR.241' The shift of this role relies mainly on the
development of economic interests, which suggests that cultural
values are less important market forces, contrary to what
conventional theory has asserted.
About two decades ago, both China and Korea were
considered to be a "pirate's paradise., 242 While China can still
claim this unflattering sobriquet, Korea is moving away from its
ignominious free-riding days and has endeavored to establish a
functional system of IPR protection regime. The different
experiences of Korea and China provide a good perspective for
comparative analysis. By examining Korea through a multifaceted
lens, it provides a useful case for assessing the extent to which a
developed economy is helped or hindered by "free riding," and
provides China a precedent which may lead to a shortcut to the
most direct and appropriate IPR management strategy.
C. Preliminary Reflections
Having applied the method of proof by contradiction, we can
237 Kim, supra note 227, at 3.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 See ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT, SOUTH KOREA AND LATE
INDUSTRIALIZATION 3-5 (1992) (introducing Korea's conversion from a learner to an
innovator).
241 Id.
242 See Vaughan, supra note 155, at 335.
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easily conclude that, if Confucian philosophy were the cause of
the enforcement problem in China, it failed to explain the current
lower rates of counterfeiting and piracy in Japan and Korea which
are equally, if not more, influenced by Confucian value than
China. The significant difference is that both Japan and Korea
have established stronger IPR regimes because of varying stages
of economic development.
243
Although some drawbacks of Confucian ethics may still
exist,244 "Confucian elites have contributed to the social and
political achievements of East Asian states such as Japan and
Korea in the post-World War II era: rapid and relatively
egalitarian economic growth, stable families, and crime-free
streets. '245  Confucian ethics have made positive contributions,
both in fostering domestic economic development and in
maintaining intellectual property in different ways. The critical
question is how to preserve the advantages of Confucian ethics
while minimizing its shortcomings.246
The objective of establishing the WTO was to liberalize world
trade and to harmonize trade policies to ensure fair access to world
markets.247 While engaging in harmonization of national trade
policies, the world trading system has promoted cultural
harmonization simultaneously, for example, through its TRIPs
standard. 248 It is clear that TRIPs has gone beyond dealing with
243 Thomas.G. Rawski, Chinese Industrial Reform: Accomplishments, Prospects,
and Implications, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 271, 272 (May 1994) (stating that IPR protections
are normally weaker in emerging markets than in developed markets).
244 Arguably, it is true that, while Confucianism trusts in devotion and honor to
seniors and ancestors, and emphasizes social order, these concerns in turn place a
systemic pressure against argument and disobedience. As such, the role of critical
thinking may be somewhat weakened.
245 Daniel A. Bell, Confucian Values for the Next Millennium, International
Conference on Universal Ethics and Asian Values (Oct. 5, 1999), http://www.
unesco.or.kr/ethics/bell.htm.
246 Id.
247 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
248 See TRIPs, supra note 128. As the most comprehensive intellectual property
agreement ever, the TRIPs Agreement aims to promote harmonization and
standardization of approach to protection by providing minimum standards for the
member states.
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"trade related" intellectual property issues. As a result of TRIPs, a
state initially pursues a variety of goals in addition to economic
development, such as cultural autonomy, but the compelling rule-
based international trade regime limits the ability of the nation to
structure its own domestic laws, that often reflect the cultural
values of that nation.249 In this context, we cannot ignore the fact
that, in a multicultural society, it is inappropriate and unwise to
strive for a unique cultural environment leading to intellectual
property harmonization. Imposing a superseding international law
in the name of trade harmonization tends to undermine the social
values and cultural diversities reflected in domestic laws.25°
Like liberal values, which are widely shared by many East-
Asian nations, "Confucian values and their political implications
may well be applicable in non-Confucian societies that share
similar political cultures and face similar political problems." 251 In
concrete terms, it might be important to promote a worldwide
conception for intellectual property protection, but it might be
equally, if not more, important to preserve traditional ethics from
which indigenous diversity and intellectual knowledge are rooted.
To overestimate or even misestimate the influence of Confucian
values can create a misleading stereotype and form of cultural
bias.
It is worth mentioning that there is a major difference between
China and these two neighboring countries. First, like Japan,
Korea has been "Americanized" to a certain degree since the end
of World War II, and the legal regime, also like Japan, has long
been heavily influenced by Western Civil Code based on the "Rule
of Law" system.252 Second, culturally, the unilateral Confucian
system in these two countries has developed into a mixed
Confucian-Christian system.253  The westernization process has
249 Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal
Culture Perspective, 1 ASiAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 6 (2000).
250 Id.
251 Bell, supra note 245.
252 See PYONG-CHOON HAHM, Korea's Initial Encounter with the Western Law
1910-1948 A.D., in KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE 137, 144-51
(1986).
253 See Kang-nam Oh, Sagehood and Metanoia: The Confucian-Christian
Encounter in Korea, 61 J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. 303, 308 (1993).
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made it much easier to make necessary adjustments.
While China shares the Confucian tradition with Japan and
Korea, China's unique socialist ideology, administrative
decentralization, inadequate judiciary and huge but inefficient
bureaucracy have made intellectual property enforcement rather
difficult. Nonetheless, it is important to note that, for practical
purposes, any approach to effectively analyzing and clarifying IPR
issues in China must rest on a balanced interplay of political and
cultural fundamentals. In other words, the enigmatic dilemma of
socio-political reform has shaped a unique model of Chinese
philosophies that have exercised indirect but decisive influence
over the effectiveness of the enforcement. Even if it reaches an
appropriate stage of economic development, without these
"fundamentals," the enforcement infrastructure will be endorsed
neither by political will of the authorities nor by the cultural
perception of the citizenry. The short answer is that only when
China has carried out its socio-political reform systemically and
integrated into international institutions will it be possible to
ensure the endeavor goes further. That is also why this article
supports policy makers in the West who try to promote the
transformation of China in both economic and, probably more
importantly, political areas.
V. Conclusion
China's IPR enforcement insufficiency is not a traditional
cultural phenomenon reflected by Confucian ethics. The
intellectual property enforcement problem is not an actual
outcome of Confucian philosophy and "to steal a book" is not an
"elegant offense." Rather, the Confucian ethics act as a unique
moral foundation for intellectual property protection. Apart from
the common reason of insufficient economic development, the
intellectual enforcement problem in China is a unique political
phenomenon resulting from the systemic dystrophy fundamental
to Chinese institutional development. In a broader sense, it may
be the source for recasting and strengthening legal enforcement in
China as a whole. China is experiencing a critical transition-the
prospect of a splendid economic landscape with political reform
having lagged far behind. Although China has committed itself to
a socialist "rule of law" state, without the spirit of liberal
democracy, "rule of law" in China will unsurprisingly remain
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symbolic and problematic. As a consequence, economic reform
has not only brought about greater prosperity, but also created
grievous crises. The cascading problems have, in many
circumstances, frustrated the efforts of ordinary Chinese citizens
to earn their living in normal ways. As a result, utilitarianism
seems to dominate many people's minds throughout the country.
In addition, the restriction of religious beliefs and the tough
control over freedom of speech have contributed to the growing
utilitarian impulse. In this context, there is no exaggeration that
counterfeiting and piracy are by-products of imperfect political
reform.
The reasons for the intellectual property enforcement problem
in China are manifold and interdependent. However, the political
aspect plays a decisive role. Despite the lack of economic strength
and technological sophistication in support of a comprehensive
IPR protection system, China has created an elaborate Western-
styled IPR regime without social foundations to strengthen its
adequate enforcement. Nevertheless, with enigmatic political
dilemmas that rival its economic prosperity, the ultimate outcome
of intellectual property enforcement largely depends on how China
will contend with the social and political fragmentation that it
currently faces. Preoccupation with China's potential for success
stems largely from the highly authoritarian system and its
absorbed promotion of coherent institutional reform and rule of
law. However, to carry out such a reform in the world's most
massive government bureaucracy will not be easy. Without help,
it is unlikely that China will be able to make the necessary
adjustments. The West should try to foster and facilitate shifts in
both economic and sociopolitical domains. This is a problem for
which there is no panacea. Any attempt for quick success and
instant benefit may result in failure.
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